Coordinating a multi-retailer decentralized distribution system with random demand based on buyback and compensation contracts

Jinyu Ren, Hualong Xie, Yonxiang Liu, Pengfei Zeng, Ze Tao

Abstract


Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to set up the coordinating mechanism for a decentralized distribution system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers by means of contracts. It is in the two-stage supply chain system that all retailers sell an identical product made by the manufacturer and determine their order quantities which directly affect the expected profit of the supply chain with random demand.

Design/methodology/approach: First comparison of the optimal order quantities in the centralized and decentralized system shows that the supply chain needs coordination. Then the coordination model is given based on buyback cost and compensation benefit. Finally the coordination mechanism is set up in which the manufacturer as the leader uses a buyback policy to incentive these retailers and the retailers pay profit returns to compensate the manufacturer.

Findings: The results of a numerical example show that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved in the multi-retailer supply chain by the buyback and compensation contracts.

Research limitations: The results based on assumptions might not completely hold in practice and the paper only focuses on studying a single product in two-stage supply chain.

Practical implications: The coordination mechanism is applicable to a realistic supply chain under a private information setting and the research results is the foundation of further developing the coordination mechanism for a realistic multi-stage supply chain system with more products.

Originality/value: This paper focused on studying the coordination mechanism for a decentralized multi-retailer supply chain by the joint application of the buyback and compensation contracts. Furthermore the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit are achieved.


Keywords


supply chain management, coordination model, compensation, buyback policy

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1303


Licencia de Creative Commons 

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2008-2019

Online ISSN: 2013-0953; Print ISSN: 2013-8423; Online DL: B-28744-2008

Publisher: OmniaScience